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Contempt by Newspaper-State v. Morris, and, in any event, did not present a "clear and.
406 P.2d 349(N.M.1965). Following the entry of present danger" to the impartial administration
a guilty plea by a former assistant prosecutor to a of justice in that case.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, noting that
charge of involuntary manslaughter (arising out
of an automobile accident in which five people its decision was controlled by prior opinions of the
died), the respondent, a newspaper columnist, Supreme Court of the United States, assumed that
wrote and published a series of articles severely the comments were made while the case was pendcritical of the judge's actions in the criminal case. ing, but held that a "clear and present danger"
The articles reported that the punishment im- to the administration of justice had not been
posed upon the former prosecutor had been a proved.
The New Mexico court held that it was "limited
twelve months deferral of sentence, and a $500 fine,
suspended upon the payment of $500 in court costs. by the United States Supreme Court's interpretaThe respondent also reported that in a case arising tion of the extent of protection afforded by the
in another county, a "humble" 20 year old man, First Amendment" and that in Bridges v. Caliwho had killed three "prominent" people under fornia, 314 U.S. 252, that court had said that "the
similar circumstances, had received a sentence of substantive evil must be 'extremely serious and
1 to 5 years in the penitentiary. "The only thing the degree of imminence extremely high before
utterances can be punished,'" and in Craig v.
the two cases seem to prove," the respondent
wrote, "is that mass killing by drunk drivers is Harney, 331 U.S. 367, had held that "the danger
not a very serious offense in New Mexico, with sought to be guarded against 'must not be remote
killing prominent people being slightly more or even probable; it must immediately imperil.'"
serious than killing humble ones. Kill a cow, drunk The court concluded, therefore, that prior New
Mexico cases which had upheld the imposition of
or sober, and see what you get." In a subsequent
column, the respondent reported that "There has the contempt power in cases where conduct had
been widespread comment about the no fine, no only tended to interfere with or obstruct the
jail judgment of the court in handling the fellow administration of justice in a pending case could
lawyer. Among the most critical are lawyers them- "no longer serve as precedents in view of the
selves who fear that the profession is being made principles laid down by the Supreme Court of the
United States."
to appear as a favored group in court."
In refusing to find that a clear and present
The attorney for the former prosecutor theredanger had been proved, the court held that "The
after filed an affidavit charging the respondent
with criminal contempt. The trial judge found that only substantive evil upon which the contempt
the articles by respondent "occurred during the charges possibly could be based, or seek to avert,
pendency of the [criminal] case, and that the de- would be the direct intereference with or influence
fendant in that case will not be sentenced and the on the court of the articles when, at the expiration
case concluded until the month of November, of the deferment period, [the defendant] would
1964, or thereafter," found the respondent guilty again appear for sentencing or other disposition of
of contempt and imposed a sentence of 10 days in the charge against him." However, the court
said, "no reference to, or speculation regarding
the county jail and a fine of $250.
On appeal, the respondent contended that the future action by the court was made in the arcontempt conviction should be reversed because ticles." And to presume that the articles would,
in fact, influence future action by the trial judge,
his comments were made after the conclusion,
not during the pendency, of the criminal case, the court said, would be to "fail to accord him
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that strength of character and judicial fortitude
so common to the judiciary and so vividly exemplified by the long record of his judicial acts."
Comment: Compare the language cited by the
court from the Bridges and Craig cases with the
recent comments of Mr. Justice Goldberg in Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562-565(1965):
"Since we are committed to a government
of laws and not of men it is of the utmost
importance that the administration of justice
be absolutely fair and orderly. This Court
has recognized that the unhindered and untrammeled functioning of our courts is part
of the very foundations of our constitutional
*

democracy.

*

*

The constitutional

safeguards relating to the integrity of the
criminal process attend every stage of a
criminal proceedings, starting with arrest and
culminating with a trial 'in a courtroom presided over by a judge.' * * * A State may
adopt safeguards necessary and appropriate
to assure that the administration of justice at
all stages is free from outside control and
influence.

*

*

*

It

is, of course,

true

that most judges, will be influenced only by
what they see and hear in court. However,
judges are human; and the legislature has
the right to recognize the danger that some
judges, jurors, and other court officials, will
be consciously or unconsciously influenced
by demonstrations in or near their courtrooms both prior to and at the time of the
trial. A State may also properly protect the
judicial process from being misjudged in the
minds of the public.

*

*

*

A State may

protect against the possibility of a conclusion
by the public... that the judge's action was
in part a product of intimidation and did not
flow only from the fair and orderly working
of the judicial process."
For an excellent and detailed examination of
the law concerning the problems engendered by
the conflicts of "free press-fair trial", see Jaffe,
The Press And The Oppressed-A Study Of PrejudicialNews Reporting In CriminalCases (pts. 1-2),
56 J. Casm. L., C. & P.S. 1, 158(1965).
Convictions Pending on Appeal and Impeachment-State v. Jolnson, 406 P.2d 403(Ariz.1965).
Defendant was convicted of selling narcotics and
appealed, inter alia, on the ground that it was
error for the prosecutor to ask, on cross-examina-
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tion, whether he had previously been convicted
of a felony. The felony conviction referred to by
the prosecutor was then on appeal.
While noting a conflict in the cases, the Arizona
Supreme Court found that the majority rule, in
force in ten state and four federal jurisdictions, is
that "a conviction is a verity until set aside, and
thus permissible to be considered by the trier of
facts as destructive of the witness' credibility.
We believe the majority rule is sound. Therefore
it was not error for the County Attorney to inquire
about the conviction."
Comment: Of course, the rule which allows a
witness to be impeached by a prior conviction of
felony pending on appeal at the time of the trial
in which the witness testifies poses some problems.
It is clear enough that a witness may not be impeached by showing a prior conviction which has
been, at the time of the trial in which the witness
testifies, reversed on appeal or set aside on motion, whether the prior conviction is for a separate
offense, People v. Van Zile, 141 N.Y.S. 168(S.C.
1913), but see Manning v. State, 123 P. 1029
(Okla.Ct.App.1912)(dictum), or for the offense
then on trial, Richardson v. State, 27 S.W. 139
(Tex.Ct.Cr.App.1894); Martin v. State, 189 S.W.
262(Tex.Ct.Cr.App.1916).
What is the rule to be, however, in those cases
where the prior conviction used to impeach is
pending on appeal at the time of the trial in which
the witness testifies, but the prior conviction has
been reversed by the time the case at which the
witness has testified reaches the appellate court?
Must the second conviction be reversed because
the witness was improperly impeached for the
reason that the debilitating conviction, having
been reversed, no longer "exists" or is a legal
nullity? Those courts ruling on the question have
said "No."
In State v. Crawford, 206 P. 717(Utah1922),
the defendant, on trial for robbery, was impeached
on cross-examination when the prosecutor elicited
the admission that he had previously been convicted of robbery, over the objection of defendant's
counsel that the prior conviction was then on appeal. When the supreme court reviewed the conviction in the second trial, it noted that defendant's
first conviction for robbery had been reversed and
remanded by that same court with directions to
grant a judgment of acquittal, but held that
since the prior conviction was final and existent
at the time it was used to impeach defendant
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in the second trial there was no error and the second conviction was affirmed. And see Latikos v.
State, 88 So. 47(Ct.App.Ala.1921)(dictum).
Peremptory Challenges and Multiple Defendants
-Anderson v. State, 406 P.2d 532(Nev.1965).
Defendants were tried for possession of narcotics
with two co-defendants. Although Nevada law
allows a single defendant on trial the right to four
peremptory challenges, the statute also provides
that when defendants are joined for trial all peremptory challenges must be exercised jointly and
only a total of four are allowed between the defendants. After a motion to sever one defendant,
on the ground that he could not agree to the exercise of a particular challenge, was denied, the
defendants "reluctantly" exercised their four
challenges, proceeded to trial and were convicted. On appeal, defendants contended that it
violated their "constitutional rights" to force them
to pool peremptory challenges. The Nevada
Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.
"There is nothing in either the Constitution of
the United States or the Nevada Constitution,"
said the court, "which requires Congress or the
state legislature to grant peremptory challenges to
defendants in criminal cases; trial by an impartial
jury is all that is secured." Because the ability to
exercise a peremptory challenge was deemed by the
court to be a privilege and not a right, and since
the Nevada legislature "has seen fit to treat several
defendants, for this purpose, as one party", multiple defendants, to "avail themselves of this
privilege ...must act accordingly ....[since] the
privilege must be taken with the limitations placed
upon the manner of its exercise."
Defendants also contended that the "one manone vote" rationale of the reapportionment cases
(Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186; Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533) compelled the conclusion that each
of them ought to be accorded four peremptory
challenges, but this contention was summarily
rejected as "without merit."
Injunctive Relief and Federal Criminal Procedings-Itvy v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 32(7th Cir.
1965). The plaintiff, a well known physician and
medical researcher, was indicted for mail fraud
and violations of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in connection with his use and promotion of the alleged anti-cancer drug, krebiozen.
After his indictment, but prior to trial, he

sought injunctive relief in the federal district court
alleging, inter alia, that he was a scientist of outstanding reputation, that krebiozen was an efficacious cancer treatment, that the federal government had never conducted a fair test of the drug's
worth and had arbitrarily interfered with the use
of the drug by cancer patients, that only a court
of equity (supervising a clinical test of the drug)
and not a lay jury could determine the merits of
the "krebiozen controversy" and that to put him
to a criminal trial without a prior court supervised
clinical test of the drug would deprive him of due
process. The district court denied relief and the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The appellate court noted that Dr. Ivy had not
challenged the validity of the statutes upon which
the indictment was based and had not challenged
the fact that the officials sought to be enjoined
(the Attorney General of the United States and
the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois) were acting within their discretion as prosecutors in proceeding with a criminal trial. The court also held that there was no
merit to the claim that the matters involved in the
criminal trial (e.g., the worth of krebiozen as a
cancer retarding agent) were "beyond the intelligence and comprehension of a jury." "'The mere
fact that the issues of a case may be complex or
confusing to a jury,' " the court said, "'does not
mean that they must remain so-the prosecution
must clarify the facts in order to present its charges
properly.'" In such a case, the court said, the
jury in the criminal trial would undoubtedly be
aided by the testimony of expert witnesses.
Double Jeopardy, Multiple Counts, and the
Hung Jury-Forsberg v. United States, 351 F.2d
242(9th Cir.1965). The defendant was charged
in a two count indictment with assault with intent to commit murder and assault with intent to
do bodily harm. Both counts, arising out of the
same act, were submitted to a jury which returned
a verdict acquitting defendant of the greater offense, but was unable to reach a verdict on the
count charging assault with intent to do bodily
harm. Without objection from defendant, the
court entered a judgment of acquittal on the
first count, declared a mistrial on the second count
and discharged the jury.
The defendant was later retried on the second
count and appealed on the ground that the second
trial "was in violation of his constitutional right
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against being placed twice in jeopardy since he
had already been acquitted on Count One, which
included the lesser offense set forth in Count
Two." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
rejected the jeopardy argument and affirmed.
The appellate court noted that at least three
principles were dear: (1) ordinarily, where a mistrial is declared because of a failure of the jury to
agree upon a verdict, the double jeopardy clause
is not violated by a retrial; (2) "an acquittal or
conviction of a greater offense is a bar to a subsequent trial of a lesser offense, necessarily included in, and a part of the greater, if under the
indictment for the greater offense the defendant
could have been convicted of the lesser offense,
and (3) if the indictment in this case had contained but a single count charging the defendant
with assault with intent to kill (a) a verdict could
have been rendered on the lesser offense, and (b)
therefore a verdict of acquittal on that count
would have barred a second trial for the lesser
offense.
The question the court faced was whether the
result set forth in (3) above ought to apply when
the government, instead of charging the defendant
in one count (naming the greater offense), charged
the defendant in two counts (naming the greater
and lesser offenses)?
The court found that it was proper for the
government to have charged the separate offenses
arising out of the same act in separate counts, but
also noted that if the defendant had been convicted of both offenses only one sentence could
have been imposed, and a conviction on either
count would have been a bar to a subsequent
prosecution on the other count. Though neither
counsel nor the court had found a case directly in
point, the court reasoned that if defendant had
been acquitted on count one and convicted on
count two, and the conviction was later reversed,
there was "no good reason" why he could not have
been retried on that count. "Nor should the fact
that there was a hung jury instead of a verdict of
conviction bar his retrial on Count Two. Obviously,
he could not in either event be retried on the charge
set forth in Count One."

single barrel 28-gauge shotgun with overall length
25Y2" from which the firing pin was missing at the
time of seizure by federal agents. "A test firing
was successfully made later by a government agent
who substituted a small wire nail for the missing
pin. . .

."

Prior to trial, defendant moved to

dismiss the indictment on the ground that the
shotgun was not a "firearm" possessed in violation
of the law on the ground that it lacked the capability of discharging a projectile by an explosion
because the firing pin was missing.
In denying defendant's motion, the court distinguished United States v. Thompson, 202 F. Supp.
503(N.D.Cal.1962), which had held that "a sawedoff shotgun from which a firing pin was missing is
not a firearm under the National Firearms Act."
"In Thompson," the court said, "there is no evidence that the court or the agent who fire tested
the weapon was aware than an ordinary wire nail,
accessible and available to almost anyone, could
be effectively substituted for the firing pin." The
court held that the fact that the firing pin was
missing was "immaterial" since the "temporarily
inoperable

instrument

can... with

minimum

effort, time and ingenuity be made to fire a shotgun shell. We feel that the purpose of the statute
would be frustrated or defeated if we accepted
defendant's contention that in the absence of the
firing pin, a shotgun is not a firearm under the
statute."
Provocation and Retaliation in Closing Arguments-State v. Flores, 405 P.2d 901(Ct.App.
Ariz.1965). Defendant was convicted of possession
of marijuana and he appealed on the ground that
the remarks of the prosecutor in closing argument
had been inflammatory and prejudicial. The prosecutor had said "We are not trying me. We are not
trying Mr. MacDonald [defense counsel]. We are
trying that [pointing at defendant] ...

that punk

over there with tattoos on his arm."
In rejecting defendant's argument, the court
noted that defense counsel, in his argument, had
said that he believed in his client's case and that
he had known the defendant "since he was a baby."
The prosecutor justified his remarks on the basis
that they were "fair comment and retaliatory to
Defective Weapon May Be Firearm-United those remarks which counsel made in his own
States v. Cosey, 244 F. Supp. 100(E.D.La.1965).
argument.. .Ihad a right to retort and retaliate
The defendant was indicted for the unlawful pos- in my own argument. The court, finding the rule
session of a "firearm" in violation of 26 U.S.C. to be that "improper remarks of the county at§5848(1). The weapon in issue was a "14Y barrel, torney when provoked by defendant's arguments
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are not generally speaking, grounds for reversal,"
held that this "statement is applicable to the case
now under consideration."

that the evidence leading to his conviction had
been obtained in a search violative of the fourth
amendment. The district court so found and discharged defendant from further custody.
The defendant had been arrested when two
Expert May Testify to Character of WoundState v. Campbell, 405 P.2d 978(Mont.1965). Con- police officers on patrol in a section of Philavicted of murder and sentenced to life imprison- delphia where "there has been a large number of
ment, the defendant appealed on the ground, inter burglaries" stopped the automobile in which dealia, that it was error to allow an "expert in foren- fendant and his two companions had been riding
sic medicine" to testify that it was his opinion, at about 8:20 P.M. "for a routine check". After
stopping the car, the officers recognized defendant
based upon examination of the bullet wounds in
and
his companions as "reputed professional
defendant's body, that the defendant had atburglars".
Removing defendant from the car, the
tempted to commit suicide. The Supreme Court
of Montana decided that the evidence was ad- officers searched the vehicle and found fifteen
silver dollars. An hour and a half after the' arrest
missible.
The court stated the question to be "Can opinion a burglary was reported to the police and "it was
evidence on the subject of whether a wound was or learned that the silver dollars found in the search
was not self-inflicted be admitted?" Looking to had come from that source."
"The question presented therefore," the court
the law of other jurisdictions, the court found that
said,
"is whether the police had probable cause to
"fourteen states and England have answered this
stop
and
search the vehicle which the relator was
question yes" and "seven jurisdictions [including
driving when the basis for the police action was
Montana] have held in the negative."
Deciding that the majority rule "is supported the reputation of the occupants as burglars and
the vehicle's presence in a neighborhood which
by the better reasoning", the court concluded
was
presently experiencing a high incidence of
that "the subject of self-inflicted wounds is not one
of such common experience that laymen may not burglaries."
In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89(1964), the court
be assisted by the opinion of a doctor, who has
noted,
the Supreme Court of the United States
special knowledge regarding anatomy and injuries
had
held
unlawful an arrest and search which was
in the human body ...and it matters not that
such an opinion involves an ultimate issue of fact." based, so far as the record revealed, solely upon
The prior Montana case, State v. Ratkovich, 105 the officer's knowledge of the defendant's reputaof being involved in gambling offenses. The
P.2d 679, which had held to the contrary, was tion
"added element of a high incidence of crime in
overruled.
the neighborhood", the court decided, was not
significant enough to take the instant case out of
Self-Incrimination and Bodily Extractionsthe Beck rationale. The court also considered
The Montana court, in the Campbell case, also
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132(1925) and
rejected defendant's contentions that the admisBrinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. (160(1949),
sion into evidence of a bullet extracted from his
where "the police had personal knowledge of the
body by a surgeon, and "X-ray photographs taken
defendants' activities," but found that in the
of the appellant while he was in the hospital underpresent case "the officers only knew of their repugoing treatment for his wounds" violated the
tations as burglars and nothing further. Here they
privilege against self-incrimination or constituted
did not even have a reliable report or trustworthy
a bodily invasion so "shocking to the conscience"
information that the relator here was engaged in
that it would violate the due process rationale of
illegal activity.
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165.
Comment: Compare the decision of the Supreme
Court of Illinois in People v. Faginkrantz, 171
Probable Cause for Arrest of Known CriminalN.E.2d 5(1960).
United States v. Myers, 245 F.Supp. 746(E.D.Pa.
1965). Defendant was convicted of burglary in a
Wong Sun, Escobedo and Voluntary ConPennsylvania trial court and sentenced to prison.
After exhausting his state remedies, he sought fessions in the State Courts-Collins v. Beto, 348
discharge on federal habeas corpus on the ground F.2d 823(5th Cir. 1965). Defendant was convicted
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of murder and sentenced to 99 years in the penitentiary. The conviction rested, almost if not
entirely, upon several confessions given by defendant to Texas authorities following his arrest
and interrogation under the following circumstances.
On November 16, 1959 a woman named Wilma
Selby was murdered in her home in Houston,
Texas. Several days later, her husband admitted
to police that he had been attempting to hire
someone to kill her, but he insisted that he did
not know who committed the crime. He implicated a woman named Maggie Morgan. Questioned by police, Maggie Morgan admitted taking
money from Mr. Selby but denied any knowledge
of the killing. Thereafter, the police began
questioning friends and associates of Maggie
Morgan, among them, the defendant Collins.
Arrested at the Morgan home, without probable
cause, Collins was questioned at police headquarters and, the next day, gave a statement
admitting that Maggie Morgan had once asked
him to kill somebody for a thousand dollars, but
that he thought the request was a joke and ignored it. Collins was released without charge
after taking a polygraph test.
On January 19, 1960, Houston police were told
by an informant, a private detective and bail
bondsman by the name of E. T. Morgan, that he
had information that Collins was the killer of Mrs.
Selby. He could not, or would not, tell the police
the source of his information. At around 7:30 P.M.
on that date, Collins was re-arrested without
warrant. He was taken to Ranger Headquarters
in Houston for the express purpose of isolating
him while the investigation proceeded. Around
midnight he was taken to an office of a justice of
the peace where a sheriff's officer swore out a
complaint charging him, under the name of Joe
Smith, with the crime of vagrancy. The charge of
vagrancy was without any basis in fact and the
officer knew that Collins' name was not "Joe
Smith." He was thereafter confined in a small
municipal jail for the night.
The next afternoon, January 20, 1960, the
officers took Collins out of the jail and returned
him to Ranger Headquarters. Around 7:00 P.M.
Collins was questioned for several hours by different police, ranger and sheriff's officers. He then
gave an oral statement concerning the crime, and
was left alone with an officer who questioned him
for an additional forty five minutes. Thereafter a
written statement was taken during the next two
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hours. The written statement included a warning
of the privilege against self incrimination.
When the written statement was concluded at
about midnight, the officers suggested to Collins
that he was not telling the whole truth. At his
request, Collins was given a polygraph test at
about 1:30 A.M. on January 21, 1960. A second
polygraph test was given thirty minutes later. The
police then began requestioning defendant at about
3:15 A.M. and shortly thereafter Collins gave a
full oral confession. After this statement was
transcribed, and signed, at about 7 A.M., Collins
was taken to the Houston police headquarters and
booked. He was formally charged with the murder
around 9:00 A.M. before a justice of the peace.
On appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas
corpus, the confession was found to be involuntary
by Chief Judge Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit and
judge Friendly of the Second Circuit (sitting by
designation in the Fifth Circuit) in an opinion by
judge Friendly. This conclusion followed from a
recitation of the factors found by the court to be
critical in coerced confession cases.
The first step of the police, the court found, was
to isolate Collins immediately after his arrest.
Second, the "unwarranted isolation of Collins
was compounded, for during the 36-hour period
ending in his second confession he saw no relatives, no friends, and no lawyer. Indeed, since he
had not been booked at the city police station nor
taken before a judicial officer, he might quite
reasonably have believed that no one would be
able to locate him until the police chose to make
his arrest public; and it is not hard to realize the
corrosive effect of such fears upon the will of one
entirely within the police's power."
Third, Collins was not told that he had the right
to consult with a lawyer, family or friends before
making any statement. Whether Rscobedo be
read broadly or narrowly, the court said, this
factor is important in determining the voluntariness
of a confession since "such advice offers a prisoner
a link with the outside world and a chance to
seek guidance other than from those who want
him to confess."
Fourth, psychiatric and psychological testimony
showed that Collins' "mental and emotional
makeup indicates that his capacity to resist pressure was strikingly low." His I.Q. was found to be
in the lowest ten percent of the population; he
would respond "abnormally" in any attempt to
avoid "stress"; his judgment was extremely poor,
and his character, when judged with reference to
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ability to withstand situations of stress, was
"more like that found in children between the ages
of three and six."
Fifth, the questioning took place "not during
normal hours but late at night after Collins had
been up during the day."
Sixth, Collins was "questioned by changing
teams of officers, who presumably had an opportunity to refresh themselves which he lacked."
Seventh, because of the failure to book or release
him after preliminary statements, "Collins could
well have believed that there would be no end
until he told the police what they wanted to hear."
Eighth, he was warned of the privilege against
self-incrimination only "after he had made the
oral confession and before he began to reiterate it
for a formal transcription."
Summarizing, the court held:
"A concluding word is called for regarding the
admitted, delieberate violations of law by
the police. The 36-hour detention of Collins
on the uncorroborated and conclusory charge
of a private bounty hunter was a gross violation of the Fourth Amendment. The police
swore to a false charge to obtain a warrant
under a false name, failed to take Collinsbefore
a magistrate as Texas requires after arrests
without warrant, and avoiding having a magistrate inform Collins of his right not to
incriminate himself. * * * The law relating to arrest and detection does not always
provide bright lines, and minor errors by the
police are hardly to be avoided. But when the
police operate in calculated and substantial
disregard of the applicable rules, they cannot
expect the benefit of any doubts as to undue
pressure in a truly close case."
In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Tuttle
advanced two additional reasons why the confessions should be held inadmissible. They were
obtained, he held, in violation of Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478(1964) and Wong Sun v
United States, 371 U.S. 471.
As to the Escobedo ground, Judge Tuttle agreed
with those courts which have read .Escobedo
broadly, i.e., as requiring the police to warn a defendant, who is a focal suspect, of his right to counsel and of the privilege against self-incrimination,
before any interrogation designed to elicit a confession is begun.
The Tuttle opinion also held the confessions to
be squarely within the prohibition of the Wong
Sun rule:

(1) "Wong Sun's exclusionary rule is equally
applicable in both the state and federal courts"
[For a contrary view see the discussion in Abstracts
of Recent Cases, 56 J. CRIb. L., C. & P.S. 506
(1965)]; (2) "A threshold question for the applicability of the Wong Sun rule in this case is whether
there was an unlawful arrest... [and since]...
the only information offered as supporting Collins'
arrest in this case, [the] E. T. Morgan 'tip', dearly
does not meet the test, and the State law enforcement officers knew it... the necessary predicate
for the application of the exclusionary rule of
Wong Sun is indisputedly present in this case";
(3) since the arrest was unlawful, it was the burden
of the state to show that Collins' confessions did
flow from the illegality; this burden was not
carried.
Judge Tuttle also suggested that "the best and
perhaps the only way to [purge the taint of the
unlawful arrest] ... would be to afford the suspect
an effective opportunity to obtain the assistance
of counsel" but that course was not followed. Nor
would it make any difference, as suggested in the
Journal reference above, if Collins' confessions
were held to be voluntary, said judge Tuttle.
"[I]f a mere showing that a confession during a
period of unlawful detention was 'voluntary' were
sufficient to establish its admissibility, Wong Sun
would be an empty promise, for the inadmissibility
of 'involuntary' confessions has... been fully
recognized ... [since] Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278(1936)."
In his concurring opinion, judge Friendly declined to rest the decision to hold the confession
inadmissible on a Wang Sun ground. He agreed
with judge Tuttle that there was no real basis to
believe that the Supreme Court meant its Wong
Sun opinion to apply only to federal trials and he
also noted that while Wong Sun involved an unlawful arrest and search, and the Collins case
involved only an unlawful arrest, that should
make no difference (But see People v. Bilderbach,
401 P.2d 921).
"I thus follow Chief judge Tuttle," said judge
Friendly, "on the general proposition that Wong
Sun prohibits the introduction in a state criminal
trial of a confession that is the resudt of an arrest
violating the Fourth Amendment, just as Mapp
prohibits the reception of an object obtained
through an unconstitutional search. Where the
problems become different is the less clear causal
relation between the unconstitutional act and the
'fruit'."
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When the police seize "real" evidence in a search
"the connection between the unconstitutional
intrusion and the booty offered at trial is so
automatic and inevitable that the latter is readily
seen as the 'fruit' of the unconstitutional act.
But when the object improperly seized is a person
and the alleged 'fruit' is a statement by him,
there intervenes the individual's own decision to
speak." In Wong Sun, Judge Friendly said, the
arrest and search which produced the confession
was coercive in nature and almost immediately
preceded it.
Concluding, Judge Friendly conceded that if
the purpose of the Wong Su rule was to provide
"maximum deterrence" to illegal arrests by state
officers, then the rationale of the Tuttle opinion
would be more persuasive. Judge Friendly, however, was unwilling to concede that an otherwise
voluntary confession should be voided simply
because it followed an unlawful arrest, especially
in cases where only "those errors of judgment
inevitable when the Fourth Amendment is being
interpreted 'on the run' "by the police are present.
M'Naghten and the Scope of Psychiatric Testimony-State v. Griffin, 406 P.2d 397(Ariz.1965).
The defendant was indicted for murder and at
his trial he raised the issue of insanity. During
the testimony of a psychiatrist (who gave the jury
his opinion that the defendant did not know
right from wrong at the time of the commission
of the offense), defendant sought to elicit further
testimony "with regard to the facts and circumstances in the defendant's background and the
defendant's mental defects or abnormalities upon
which the psychiatrist based his ultimate opinion."
The trial judge refused to allow such explanatory
testimony and also refused to allow defendant to
testify concerning "his personal history during
the nine years of his marriage, holding that such
testimony was too remote." Following conviction,
defendant appealed and the Supreme Court of
Arizona reversed, holding that such testimony
should have been admitted in support of the
psychiatrist's opinion.
In considering the issue, the court noted that
Wigmore had said [of this kind of case] that "The
first and fundamental rule then, will be that
any and all conduct of the person is admissible in
evidence. There is no restriction as to the kind of
conduct. There can be none; for if a specific act
does not indicate insanity it may indicate sanity."
(2 Wigmore, Evidence §228). The court then laid
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down a broad rule to govern the conduct of future
cases in which the insanity defense is raised:
"To resolve this vital issue of criminal
responsibility it is necessary that the jury
have the entire picture of the defendant. Insanity resulting in criminal acts is not a sudden growth even if the prohibited conduct
seems to be of a sudden explosive nature.
*

*

*

The condition of

the defendant

must be explained to the jury in understandable terms.

*

*

*

To allow a psychiatrist

as an expert witness to answer without any
explanation the question of whether the
accused knew the difference between right
and wrong at the time he committed the act
would impart a meaningless conclusion to
the jury. The jury must be given an opportunity to evaluate the expert's conclusion by
his testimony as to what matters he took into
consideration to reach it. Therefore the psychiatrist should be allowed to relate what
matters he necessarily considered as a 'case
history' not as to indicate the ultimate truth
thereof, but as one of the bases for reaching
his conclusion, according to accepted medical
practice."
Double Jeopardy Restrictions and State TrialsUnited States ex rel Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d
844(2d Cir.1965). The defendant Hetenyi was
indicted and tried in a New York state court for
the murder of his wife. The indictment charged
first degree murder. At the trial, the jury was
given verdicts finding the defendant guilty of first
degree murder, guilty of second degree murder,
guilty of first degree manslaughter, or not guilty.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty of second
degree murder.
Hentenyi appealed his conviction and it was
reversed by the appellate court on the grounds
that evidence had been improperly admitted and
that the jury had been erroneously charged on the
issue of venue. Hentenyi was thereafter tried
again under the old indictment charging first
degree murder. At the second trial, with the
same verdicts offered to the jury, be was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to
death. Upon appeal from the second judgment of
conviction, the case was reversed by the Court of
Appeals for inflammatory and prejudicial argument by the prosecutor to the jury.
Hentenyi was then tried a third time under the
original indictment. Again the same alternative
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verdicts were available to the jury. He was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to
a term of forty years to life. The conviction was
affirmed by the appellate court and leave to
appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Thereafter, Hentenyi filed a peittion for writ of
habeas corpus in the federal district court alleging
that his third conviction violated the due process
clause. The District Court dismissed the petition
and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed.
Speaking for the court, judge [now Solicitor
General] Marshall held that "The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes
some limitations on a state's power to reprosecute
an individual for the same crime." This conclusion
was reached, in spite of the fact that the Supreme
Court had never so held, because the court found
that "Abhorrence to successive reprosecutions is
deeply rooted in our common law traditions, and
the Bill of Rights' curb on the power of the federal
government to reprosecute is ample recognition of
how central this abhorrence is to our constitutional concept of justice" (emphasis added) and
the fact that every state has a provision in either
its constitution or statutes equivalent to the
double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution
revealed "a societal understanding" that the
exercise of such power by any government was
offensive. The Due Process clause, the court held,
thus "spann[ed] the gap" between the fifth
amendment's double jeopardy prohibition and a
similar prohibition derived from state laws "to
preserve this societal understanding."
The court decided that it could reach this result
without having to choose between conflicting
theories of how the specific protections of the
federal Bill of Rights are read into the Due Process
Clause. Whether the theory is the simple federal
standard (in which the specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights are literally held to be incorporated
into due process) or the basic core standard (in
which only the fundamental or "core" protections
of the Bill of Rights' clauses are read into due
process) or the findamental fairness test, makes
no difference, the court held, since the conduct
under scrutiny would violate all three standards.
If the first test were to be employed, it is clear
that application of the federal standard would
void Hentenyi's conviction under the rationale of
Green v. United States, 355. U.S. 184(1957). If the
basic core standard were to be employed, the
court was prepared to hold that the Greenrationale

went to the heart of the fifth amendment. If the
last test were to be used, the court would find that
"in these circumstances a reprosecution for first
degree murder is fundamentally unfair." Because
the Supreme Court was sharply divided between
the first two tests, however, the court of appeals
chose to rest its decision on the third.
The constitutional violation which infected the
third trial, the court found, was the action of the
state in retrying Hentenyi for first degree murder
when the jury at the first trial had failed to find
him guilty of that offense. The court disclaimed,
however, the notion that it reached this conclusion
on the theory that the failure of the jury to find a
verdict on first degree murder in the first trial (by
returning only a verdict of second degree murder)
worked an implied acquittal for that offense.
The failure to return the first degree verdict,
the court reasoned, could be explained on several
alternative grounds: (1) the jury unanimously
believed him innocent of first degree murder and
unanimously believed him guilty of second degree
murder, and so found (an implied acquittal of the
greater charge); (2) the jury could not unanimously agree upon the greater charge, but unanimously agreed upon the lesser offense and therefore found him guilty of the charge they could all
agree upon; (3) the jury could have believed him
guilty of first degree murder but chose to find him
guilty of the lesser offense out of sympathy and a
desire to see him receive a lesser punishment; or
(4) the jury simply did not "understand the
difference between the various degrees of homicide
or the jury made a choice between the various
degrees on the basis of some method of random
selection."
The court found that the evils of repeated prosecutions, e.g., "The insecurity and anxiety, the
opportunity of harassment, and the marginal
increase in the probability of convicting the accused of a crime he did not commit by simply
trying him again" were present in the subsequent
prosecution regardless of why the jury returned no
verdict on the charge of first degree murder in the
first trial. In addition, the court held that the
evils of reprosecution were enlarged in this case
for, under New York law, the defendant had
subjected himself to the dangers of reprosecution
for the greater offense only because he had successfully appealed from a conviction for the lesser
offense. If he had not appealed his first conviction
for second degree murder, he could not thereafter
have been prosecuted for first degree murder. This
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"incredible dilemma", the court said, placed an
"unconscionable premium upon a successful appeal
by an accused" and thus threatened "a vital
societal interest"-the assurance "that liberty
shall not be deprived without a trial free from
legal error prejudicing the accused's substantial
rights."
The court also refused to accept the rationale
that subsequent prosecutions upon the greater
charge served another societal interest, i.e., "that
the case against the accused 'go on until there
shall be a trial free from the corrosion of substantial legal error' ". That theory, which underlies the
decision in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
merely guarantees to the state the right to have a
trial free from error prejudicial to the presentation
of its case. Allowing the state to appeal from a
verdict of acquittal brought about in a trial in
which error was committed against the state does,
indeed, the court said, "provide the state with an
opportunity 'to do better a second time'" but
only because "it had been prejudiced by substantial
legal error the first time, not because it simply
failed to succeed the first time." This, the court
thought, and the Supreme Court had so held,
"could hardly be classified as fundamentally
unfair." To permit reprosecution for the greater
offense in the circumstances of the present case,
however, "is to provide the prosecution with an
opportunity 'to do better a second time,' not
because it had been prejudiced by substantial legal
error the first time, but because the accused had
been prejudiced by substantial legal error and
because these errors had been perceived on
appeal." (Emphasis added.)
The court recognized, however, that society did
have a legitimate interest in reprosecuting an
accused for an offense in those situations where
the first conviction (for the same offense) had
simply been reversed on appeal or on collateral
attack. This interest could be served in this case,
the court said, by reprosecuting Hentenyi only for
the lesser offense of which he had been convicted
at the first trial-second degree murder.
The court recognized that the evils of repeated
prosecutions, i.e., harrassment and anxiety, mentioned above could not now be remedied by the
writ of habeas corpus for they had accompanied
the third conviction and were history. The court
concluded, however, that since "there was a reasonable possibility that the conduct of the trial
and the deliberations of the jury were affected by
the' fact that Hentenyi was indicted, prosecuted
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and charged with first degree murder," and since
"the State was constitutionally forbidden to prosecute him for first degree murder following the
completion of the first trial", Hentenyi was now
"held in custody in violation of the Due Process
Clause... "
Comment: The opinion of the court does not
forbid the state from retrying the defendant for
second degree murder. But if the rule is "fundamental fairness", as the court found, and if it is
"cruel and inhuman" and a "hardship so acute
and shocking that our polity will not endure it" to
retry Hentenyi for first degree murder after a jury
has failed to find him guilty of that offense but
has instead found him guilty of a lesser offense,
as the court also found, then why is it not just as
cruel, or shocking or fundamentally unfair to
allow the State of New York to now try Hentenyi
for the fourth time-for any offense? Why must he
endure four trials for murder only because the
errors of the state voided three previous trials? And
if this does not offend any technical notions of
jeopardy, why does it not, at least, violate due
process? Surely the considerations (anxiety,
harassment and the greater chance of conviction)
which led the court to conclude that repeated
prosecutions for the same offense violate due
process will be present-perhaps to a greater
degree than in any of the previous three trials-at
the fourth trial. Surely the simple fact that
Hentenyi will only be charged with second degree
murder at the fourth trial, while he was charged
with first degree murder at the third trial, is not
so fundamental that it will countenance a fourth
prosecution in the first instance but not a third
prosecution in the second instance.
In fact, why is it not just as much a violation of
due process (to the extent that the evils of repeated prosecutions are present) to allow a state
ever to retry a man when a jury has simply failed
to agree upon any verdict in the first trial or when
a verdict of conviction has been reversed on appeal
for error?
Right to Counsel During Psychiatric Examination-In re Spencer, 406 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1965). The
defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced
to death. After direct appeals were unavailing, he
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
Supreme Court of California alleging, inter alia,
that it was a violation of his federal constitutional right to counsel to allow a psychiatrist to
testify to admissions made by him during the
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course of a psychiatric examination at which his
counsel was not present.
In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201(1964),
the Supreme Court held that it was a violation of
the right to counsel for agents of the government
to elicit incriminating statements from a defendant in the absence of counsel once the defendant
had been indicted and counsel had been employed.
The California court determined, therefore, that
the rationale of Massiah governed the present
case. Defendant had been indicted, had counsel
and an agent of the government (the courtappointed psychiatrist) testified to incriminating
admissions secured from the accused in a psychiatric examination conducted without the presence
of his counsel. The fact that it was not the function
of the psychiatrist to elicit incriminating statements for use as evidence of guilt (the function of
the federal agents in Massiah) was irrelevant, the
court said, and, in fact, posed a greater danger to
the uncounseled defendant since "an agent of the
court in reality lulls a defendant into making
incriminatory statements.. . ." The court also
held that the "psychiatric examination occurs
during a 'critical period of the proceedings'"
since "if defendant's statements to the psychiatrist
may be introduced at the guilt trial, defendant's
need of counsel is as acute during the psychiatric
interview as during the police interrogation."
"Accordingly," said the court, "we hold that if
the court-appointed psychiatrist's testimony as to
petitioner's incriminating statements was to be
admissible, petitioner was entitled to the presence
of counsel during the psychiatric examination."
The court also recognized, however, that the
presence of counsel "may largely negate the value
of the examination. Surely the presence and
participation of counsel would hinder the establishment of the rapport that is so necessary in a
psychiatric examination." In view of this, the
court held that the presence of counsel would not
be constitutionally required if the following
procedural steps were taken:
(1) Before submitting to a psychiatric examination, the defendant must be represented
by counsel or waive the right of counsel;
(2) Counsel must be informed of the proposed examination;
(3) If the defendant, upon the advice of his
counsel, submits to the examination but does
not place his mental condition in issue at the
trial, the psychiatrist cannot testify at the
trial, and, consequently, will not testify to any

incriminating statements made during the
examination;
(4) If the defendant, upon the advise of his
counsel, submits to the examination and does
place his mental condition in issue at the
trial, the psychiatrist may testify to any
incriminating statements made during the
examination, but the court must instruct the
jury that the statements are not to be taken
as proof of the truth of the matters disclosed
by the statements and may be considered by
the jury "only for the limited purpose of
showing the information upon which the
psychiatrist based his opinion" concerning
defendant's mental condition.
The court held that the compromise position
represented in (4) was fair to the defendant who
placed his mental condition into issue at the trial
since after "voluntarily submitting to the examination, defendant cannot properly preclude expert
testimony on a subject that he has himself injected
into the trial." "The procedures outlined above,
the court held, "are sufficient to justify the exclusion of counsel from the psychiatric examination
and at the same time avoid a deprivation of defendant's constitutional rights."
The court also held that the trial court, in the
exercise of its discretion, could, "depending on the
attitude of the psychiatrists involved", allow counsel to be present during the examination, and,
moreover, might "allow a defense psychiatrist to
be present during the examination by a courtappointed psychiatrist."
The Psychiatric Examination and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination-State v. Whitlow, 210
A.2d 763(N.J.). In the Whitlow case, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey came to the same conclusion
that was reached by the California Supreme Court
in Spencer, discussed above, namely, that it was
within the discretion of the trial court to allow
counsel to be present during an examination by a
state or court-appointed psychiatrist and that
defendant had no absolute constitutional right to
counsel's presence. In Whitlow, however, the New
Jersey court considered at length the problems
created by the privilege against self-incrimination
when intertwined with the request of the state to
have its doctors examine a defendant, especially
when the doctors sought to question the defendant
concerning the circumstances of the offense and/or
the defendant refused to cooperate with the psychiatrists in submitting to, or answering questions

